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E. O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, MO
SUBJ: ASSESSEMENT OF U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR MOROCCO
FOR FY 1979

REF: STATE 133136

1. THE OVERRIDING JUSTIFICATION FOR US MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO MOROCCO IS THE PRESERVATION OF REGIONAL STABILITY IN NORTH AFRICA (A) TO PRECLUDE POSSIBLE BIG POWER CONFRONTATION AND (B) TO REINFORCE OUR VALUABLE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH MOROCCO (AND FOR THAT MATTER ALGERIA). THIS RELATIONSHIP INCLUDES (SEE ALSO RABAT 1965):

A) POLITICAL - MOROCCO CONTINUES TO BE HELPFUL TO US IN SUPPORTING MODERATE POSITIONS IN THIRD WORLD COUNCILS, IN COUNTERING SOVIET ADVANCES ON THE AFRICAN CONTINENT, AND IN SEEKING A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM. MOROCCO ALSO PROVIDES FACILITIES FOR A VOA RELAY STATION BROADCASTING TO EASTERN EUROPE AND TO THE MIDDLE EAST.

B) ECONOMIC - MOROCCO IS A LEADING EXPORTER AND HAS VAST RESERVES OF PHOSPHATES, UPON WHICH WORLD (AND U.S.) DEPENDENCE WILL GROW IN YEARS TO COME. MOROCCO IS ALSO MOVING FORWARD TO
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EXTRACT URANIUM FROM ITS PHOSPHATES IN COOPERATION WITH U.S. PRIVATE ENTERPRISE. U.S.-MOROCCAN TRADE AND INVESTMENT ARE GROWING, PARTICULARLY THE MOROCCAN MARKET FOR U.S. TECHNOLOGY.

C) MILITARY - MOROCCO'S STRATEGIC LOCATION BEARS ON OUR UNRESTRICTED ACCESS TO THE MEDITERRANEAN; THE GOM PERMITS REGULAR VISITS BY USN SHIPS, INCLUDING NUCLEAR POWERED VESSELS; HAS AGREED TO ACCEPT THE LOCATION ON ITS SOIL OF A GROUND-BASED ELECTRO-

OPTICAL DEEP SPACE SURVEILLANCE (GEODSS) STATION; AND IS A POTENTIAL SITE FOR OTHER US MILITARY FACILITIES.

D) INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION - WE ARE THE BENEFICIARIES OF INCREASINGLY VALUABLE COOPERATION IN THIS FIELD.

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES

1. TO HELP PROVIDE THE MINIMUM NECESSARY MILITARY DETERRENCE TO COUNTER EXTERNAL THREATS, ESPECIALLY FROM SOVIET-ARMED ALGERIA AND LIBYA.
2. TO MAINTAIN MOROCCO'S PRESENT MODERATE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIENTATION.
3. LB PRESERVE ACCESS TO MOROCCO FOR CURRENT AND POTENTIAL U.S. MILITARY PURPOSES.
4. TO HELP PRESERVE INTERNAL STABILITY, THEREBY ENCOURAGING RECENT POSITIVE TRENDS IN HUMAN RIGHTS.
5. TO DEVELOP AND MAINTAIN INFLUENCE WITH THE MOROCCAN MILITARY, A MAJOR FACTOR FOR STABILITY IN THE COUNTRY.

2. THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ARE KEYED TO PARAGRAPH 4 OF STATE 133136:

PARA 4A: SINCE ITS BORDER WAR IN 1963 WITH ALGERIA, MOROCCO CORRECTLY SEES ITS PRINCIPAL THREAT AS COMING FROM ALGERIA IN THE FOLLOWING FORMS:

(A) AN ARMOR AND MECHANIZED INFANTRY THRUST SUPPORTED BY AIR AND SECRET

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ARTILLERY, WITH THE MAIN ATTACK MOST LIKELY IN THE NORTH ALONG THE OUJDA-TAZA AXIS.

(2) TACTICAL AIR STRIKES AGAINST MAJOR MOROCCAN CITIES AND MILITARY BASES.

(3) SMALL UNIT NAVAL OPERATIONS, ESPECIALLY ALONG THE MEDITERRANEAN COAST.

(4) CONTINUED MATERIAL, TRAINING AND PROPAGANDA FOR THE POLISARIO GUERRILLAS IN THE SAHARAN TERRITORIES.

THE GOM IS ALSO MAKING LARGE ARMS PURCHASES FROM FRANCE (ITS LEADING SUPPLPFR) AND NHTHER COUNTRIES TO PRECLUDE OVERDEPENDENCE ON ANY ONE COUNTRY. HROM IS ALSO WORKING TO NEUTRALIZE ALGERIAN AND OTHER RADICAL SUPPORT FOR POLISARIO ACTIVITIES THROUGH DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS AND POLITICAL AND MILITARY SUPPORT FOR MAURITANIA. GOM ALTERNATIVES ARE TO ADJUST THE QUANTITY OF ARMS AND EQUIPMENT BEING PURCHASED UNDER THE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM, OR TO OBTAIN THE ARMS FROM NEW SUPPLIER(S). IT MAY BE ASSUMED THAT ALGERIA IS CLOSELY MONITORING THE MOROCCAN ARMS PROCUREMENT PROGRAM, AND THE POLITICAL INFERENCES WOULD BE DRAWN FROM ANY CHANGE IN MILITARY PURCHASES BY GOM.

PARA 4B: NOT APPLICABLE -- SEE PARAGRAPH 4A ABOVE.

PARA 4C: GIVEN ALGERIA'S ARMOR-HEAVY GROUND THREAT, MOROCCO HAS IMPLEMENTED AN ARMY MODERNIZATION PROGRAM FOR AN ARMOR-HEAVY US-EQUIPPED FORCE OF TWO BRIGADES (ONE-THIRD OF MOROCCAN GROUND FORCES) TO COMPLEMENT ITS EXISTING FRENCH/SOVIET-EQUIPPED ELEMENTS. THE US EQUIPMENT PACKAGE ALONE DOES NOT COMPRISE A DETERRENT TO THE EXTERNAL THREAT. THE ROYAL MOROCCAN AIR FORCE MUST INCREASE ITS COMBAT SUPPORT ROLE AND ITS AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY TO BALANCE THE ALGERIAN AIR THREAT. THIS IS BEING DONE THROUGH DEVELOPMENT OF AN AIR DEFENSE RADAR SYSTEM AND FIGHTER AIRCRAFT ACQUISITIONS. THE ROYAL MOROCCAN NAVY IS SLOWLY BUT STEADILY EXPANDING BOTH NUMBERS AND TYPES OF VESSELS AND ITS CURRENT ONE-BATTALION MARINE FORCE TO IMPROVE ITS CAPABILITY TO RESPOND TO AN ATTACK. USG INTERESTS CONTINUE TO WARRANT
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PARTICIPATION IN THE 1973 JOINT U.S.-MOROCCAN PLAN FOR TWO-BRIGADE MODERNIZATION. A MODERATE INCREASE IN U.S. ARMS SALES IN SUPPORT OF THE OVERALL MODERNIZATION PROGRAM DESIGNED TO DEFEND AGAINST A GROWING ARSENAL TO THE EAST (ALGERIA AND LIBYA) WOULD BE IN THE USG INTEREST. WE DO NOT, HOWEVER, ENVISAGE OUR GOING BEYOND A MINIMUM NECESSARY DETERRENCE OR ATTEMPTING TO REPLACE EXISTING FRENCH OR SOVIET EQUIPMENT, OUR AIM BEING TO PRESERVE THE BASIC CURRENT BALANCE OF FOREIGN INTERESTS WITHIN MOROCCO AND AVOID BECOMING OVERLY PROMINENT AS A SUPPLIER.

PARA 4D: PROCUREMENT OF MAJOR ITEMS IN THE MOROCCAN MILITARY MODERNIZATION PROGRAM WILL HAVE BEEN COMPLETED BY FY 1979. HOWEVER, THE GOM IS LIKELY TO ACQUIRE THE FOLLOWING DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES IN PRIORITY ORDER FROM THE US IN FY 79 IN SUPPORT OF ITS MILITARY MODERNIZATION PROGRAM.

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(1) AUTOMATED NATIONAL LOGISTICS/CONTROL SYSTEM. COMMERICAL PURCHASE. TO MEET AN URGENT NEED TO MODERNIZE THE ENTIRE MOROCCAN ARMED FORCES LOGISTICS SYSTEM TO BE ABLE TO ACCOMMODATE THE SYSTEMS BEING ACQUIRED AND THE MULTIPLICITY OF EXISTING ITEMS. THE EXISTING MANUAL SYSTEM SIMPLY CANNOT COPE WITH THE QUANTITY AND COMPLEXITY OF THE EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL COMPRISING THE MODERNIZED ARMED FORCES. THE SYSTEM CURRENTLY BEING DISCUSSED WITH A U.S. FIRM WILL PROVIDE TOTAL SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN THE OPERATION OF THIS SYSTEM. NO SUBSTITUTE PRODUCT IS ACCEPTABLE BUT SUBSTITUTE SUPPLIER IS POSSIBLE.

(2) PRECISION MEASUREMENT EQUIPMENT LABORATORY (PMEL). COMMERICAL PURCHASE. TO FILL THE ABSENCE OF TEST AND MEASURING CAPABILITIES IN MOROCCO. THIS DICTATES THAT GOM BE DEPENDENT UPON US OR OTHER FOR PMEL SERVICES. US INTERESTS ARE IDENTIFIED WITH THE MAINTENANCE AND THE PRECISION FUNCTIONING OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY ITEMS OF US ORIGIN. CURRENT ARRANGEMENTS ARE NOT RESPONSIVE TO THE EQUIPMENT CALIBRATION NEEDS OF CRITICAL GOM ASSETS (PRECISION TOOLS, AIR AND GROUND COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENTS, ETC.) GOM IS CONSIDERING A US COMMERICAL PROPOSAL FOR A CAPABILITY TO REPAIR, CALIBRATE AND CERTIFY PRECISION-MEASURING EQUIPMENT REQUIRING LABORATORY OR RELATED SERVICES (I.E., A NATIONAL
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BUREAU OF STANDARDS). THE PROPOSAL INCORPORATES THE "TURN KEY" APPROACH; PHYSICAL PLANT, EQUIPMENT, TRAINING AND FIELD ENGINEERING SUPPORT AND SERVICES. SUCH A PROGRAM WILL ENABLE GOM TO BECOME TOTALLY SELF-SUFFICIENT IN THE AREA OF MAINTAINING PRECISION

STANDARDS IN SUPPORT OF BOTH THE MILITARY SECTOR AND ITS EVER-INCREASING CIVIL AVIATION SECTOR. ALTERNATIVELY GOM COULD CONTINUE TO UTILIZE THE "REPAIR AND RETURN" METHOD OF CALIBRATING PRECISION INSTRUMENTS/EQUIPMENT. THIS METHOD DOWNGRADES ASSET AVAILABILITY AND DICTATES MOROCCAN DEPENDENCE ON OUTSIDE SUPPORT FOR THIS CRITICAL SERVICE. PMEL TECHNOLOGY IS AVAILABLE FROM WESTERN EUROPEAN SOURCES. DUE TO THE DENSITY OF US SUPPLIED EQUIPMENT, USING SOCIETY OF AMERICAN ENGINEERS (SAE) MEASUREMENT SCALES WITH A US EQUIPPED FACILITY APPEARS TO BE THE MOST LOGICAL.

(3) WHEELED/TRACKED VEHICLE REPAIRS FACILITY. FMS DEPENDABLE UNDERTAKING. TO DEVELOP A GENERAL SUPPORT-DEPOT LEVEL CAPABILITY

TO SUPPORT THE ARMY'S APPROXIMATELY 800 TRACKED VEHICLES AND EVEN MORE WHEELED VEHICLES PURCHASED FROM THE US. THE IN-COUNTRY CAPABILITY AT THIS LEVEL CURRENTLY SUPPORTING FRENCH AND EAST-BLOC EQUIPMENT IS NOT SUFFICIENTLY TRANSFERABLE TO MORE SOPHISTICATED AMERICAN EQUIPMENT. THE SKILL SHORTAGE IS FELT MOST ACUTELY IN THE AREA OF AUTOMATIC TRANSMISSIONS AND FINAL DRIVE. AS CURRENT REPAIR REQUIRMENTS PREVENT THE RELEASE OF MECHANICS TO ATTEND TRAINING IN THE US, GOM HAS DECLINED SUCH TRAINING AND HAS SIGNED AN LOA FOR A COMPLETE DRIVE TRAIN REPAIR FACILITY. THE US INTERESTS ARE IDENTIFIED WITH "SYSTEMS APPROACH" IN PROVIDING SUPPORT ALONG WITH THE END ITEMS. THE PRINCIPAL ALTERNATIVE, A REPAIR AND RETURN CASE, IS NOT DESIRABLE FOR THE SAME REASONS STATED IN THE PRECEDING SUBPARAGRAPH. ADDITIONALLY, GOM HAS CONSISTENTLY TRIED TO IMPROVE ITS IN-COUNTRY TECHNOLOGICAL INFRASTRUCTURE. THUS A REPAIR AND RETURN CASE COULD NEGATE THEIR SECRET

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EFFORTS TOWARD SELF-SUFFICIENCY. AN ALTERNATIVE SUPPLIER (NON US) IS POSSIBLE, BUT NOT LOGICAL AS THE MAJOR END ITEMS ARE US MANUFACTURED.

(4) FIELD ENGINEERING EQUIPMENT. FMS PURCHASE DEPENDABLE UNDERTAKING. REQUIRED FOR THE REPAIR AND EXPANSION OF EXISTING FACILITIES AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF NEW FACILITIES, INCLUDING AIRFIELDS. THIS EQUIPMENT IS VITAL TO MOROCCAN ARMED FORCES MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS, AS MOST MILITARY FACILITIES ARE THOSE FROM THE FRENCH AND US MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE 1950'S AND EARLY 1960'S AND ARE BADLY IN NEED OF RENOVATION OR REPLACEMENT. OUTSIDE THE ARMED FORCES, SUCH EQUIPMENT IS ESSENTIAL TO UPGRADE AND EXPAND INFRASTRUCTURE AS PART OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT. GOM ALREADY PURCHASES SOME OF ITS HEAVY EQUIPMENT FROM FRANCE AND GERMANY. AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO US PURCHASES COMPETITIVE PRICING BY OTHER COUNTRIES MAY EASILY PREVAIL FOR THIS EQUIPMENT.

PARA 4E: MOROCCO FOR SEVERAL YEARS BEGINNING IN THE LATE 60'S SPENT VERY LITTLE ON DEFENSE. WITH INCREASING OBSOLENCE AND THE NEED TO REPLACE EQUIPMENT AFTER PARTICIPATION IN THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (GOLAN CAMPAIGN), A REPLACEMENT PROGRAM WAS UNDERTAKEN IN 1974 AND ACCELERATED IN 1976 WITH THE OUTBREAK OF POLISARIO HOSTILITIES IN THE SOUTH. SINCE THE END OF 1975, HOWEVER, RELATIVELY LITTLE OF MOROCCO'S FOREIGN EXCHANGE EARNING HAS BEEN REQUIRED FOR THIS PURPOSE, AS ALMOST ALL PURCHASES ARE RELIABLY UNDERSTOOD TO HAVE BEEN FINANCED BY SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT. IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT THE PEAK IN REEQUIPMENT OUTLAYS WILL OCCUR IN FY 79, WITH THE DEFENSE BURDEN AS A SHARE OF GNP DECLINING THEREAFTER. THE FOLLOWING TABLE SHOWS THE RECENT TREND

DH MILLION (\$ EQUIV):

YEAR	TOTAL BUDGET	DEFENSE	DEFENSE AS PERCENT	AS PERCENT
	PORTION	OF TOTAL BUDGET	OF GNP	
1975	15,136(3,364)	1,370(304)	9 PERCENT	3.5

1976	18,078(4,017)	2,340(520)	13 PERCENT	3.0
1977	20,629(4,584)	3,509(780)	17 PERCENT	4.2

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WITH FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FROM SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT, THE MOROCCAN ECONOMY IS ABSORBING MILITARY COSTS WITHOUT MAJOR DIFFICULTY OR DISRUPTION. CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES ARE HAVING BENEFICAL EFFECTS SUCH AS ROADWORK AND OTHER CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS INVOLVING MILITARY ENGINEERS. TRAINING PROGRAMS IN MAINTENANCE, COMMUNICATIONS, AND OPERATION SKILLS ARE CREATING CADRES OF SKILLED WORKMEN. THE EXTREMELY SCARCE TRAINING FACILITIES IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR WILL BECOME A FOCUS OF ATTENTION IN THE NEXT FIVE-YEAR PLAN. THE ARMED FORCES, MOREOVER, HAVE SEVERAL ENGLISH-TEACHING PROGRAMS AT VARIOUS LEVELS, PROVIDING LANGUAGE SKILLS WHICH WILL EVENTUALLY BECOME AVAILABLE TO THE CIVILIAN COMMUNITY. ON THE NEGATIVE SIDE, THE BUDGET UNDERSTATES MILITARY EXPENDITURES DUE TO EXIGENCIES OF MILITARY AND DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES IN THE SAHARA. FOR THE SECOND YEAR RUNNING, A NEW BUDGET ITEM ENTITLED "UNFORESEEN AND UNDECIDED EXPENSES" HAS BEEN PROVIDED.

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THIS AMOUNT, FIXED AT DH 1155 MILLION (\$257 MILLION) AGAINST DH 755.5 MILLION (\$168 MILLION) IN 1976, REFLECTS CONTINUING UNCERTAINTIES IN THE SAHARA. WITH CONSUMER GOODS COSTS THROUGH-

OUT MOROCCO RISING RAPIDLY, CONCERN HAS BEEN EXPRESSED OVER ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF SAHARAN EXPENDITURES. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THE PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF INFLATION ARE NOT SAHARA-RELATED, BUT DERIVE FROM (1) GOVERNMENT'S LIFTING OF CONSUMER SUBSIDIES; (2) THE HIGHER COST OF IMPORTED FUEL; (3) POOR HARVEST OF BASIC CROPS DUE TO DROUGHT IN THREE OF THE PAST FOUR YEARS; AND (4) THE STRENGTH OF THE COUNTRY'S INDUSTRIALIZATION PROGRAM RELYING ON IMPORTED MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT WHOSE COST HAS BEEN RISING WORLDWIDE. IN SUM, AT LEAST FOR THE PRESENT THE GOM'S EXPENDITURES ON DEFENSE, WHILE NOT NEGLIGIBLE, DO NOT CONSTITUTE A SIGNIFICANT CONSTRAINT ON THE OVERALL ECONOMY OR THE GOM'S DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM. FOR DETAILED ESTIMATES SEE TABLE D-2 AND D-3 OF MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROJECTIONS, FY 1979-83. SEE ALSO OUR ANALYSIS OF CENTRAL BUDGET (RABAT A-02).

PARA 4F: THE NUMBERS OF USG OR CIVILIAN CONTRACT PERSONNEL IN COUNTRY ARE DIFFICULT TO PREDICT SINCE WE DO NOT KNOW PRECISELY GOM INTENTIONS. THE GOM PLANS TO CONSTRUCT SEVERAL REPAIR FACILITIES OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS. THE WESTINGHOUSE RADAR
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CONTRACT (AIR DEFENSE) WILL ALSO REQUIRE ADDITIONAL US PERSONNEL. OUR BEST ESTIMATES FOR THE NEXT FOUR YEARS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

MUSLO	17
WESTINGHOUSE (RADAR CONTRACT)	VARIABLE 40 TO 10 (CIVILIAN)
LOCKHEED (C-130)	VARIABLE 15 TO 1 (CIVILIAN)
FORD (CHAPPRAL REPAIR FACILITY)	VARIABLE 30 TO 4 (CIVILIAN)
FORD (PMEL)	VARIABLE 20 TO 2 (CIVILIAN)
AMC (VEHICLE REPAIR FACILITY)	VARIABLE 3 TO 2 (CIVILIAN)

WE FORESEE NO PROBLEMS FROM THIS ADDED US PRESENCE, WHICH WILL BE SEEN AS PART OF THE INCREASING US COMMERCIAL PRESENCE IN MOROCCO.

PARA 4G; IN GENERAL, COMPARABLE KINDS OF DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES ARE AVAILABLE FROM OTHER COUNTRIES. GOM'S PRESENT ORIENTATION MAKES EUROPE-BASED SUPPLIERS A LIKELIER SOURCE THAN SOVIET SUPPLIERS, ALTHOUGH THE TECHNOLOGICAL SIMPLICITY OF THE LATTER'S EQUIPMENT IS IN SOME CASES ATTRACTIVE. SPECIFICALLY (SEE PARA 4D ABOVE) THE NATIONAL AUTOMATED LOGISTICS SYSTEM CAN BE ACQUIRED FROM WESTERN EUROPE, AND PHILIPS, SIEMENS AND OTHERS ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY COMPETITIVE IN DATA PROCESSING. VEHICLE REPAIR TECHNOLOGY AND FACILITIES CAN ALSO BE PURCHASED ELSEWHERE (MOST LIKELY: UK, FRANCE, FRG), ALTHOUGH IT MAKES MOST SENSE TO ACQUIRE THIS FROM THE SUPPLIER OF THE MAJOR END ITEM. USG DENIAL OF VEHICLE REPAIR CAPABILITY FOR U.S. EQUIPMENT WOULD MOST PROBABLY RESULT IN ANOTHER MOROCCAN EFFORT TO DEVELOP A LOCAL CAPABILITY TO MAINTAIN FOREIGN-PROCURED END ITEMS. SHOULD THIS FAIL, GOM WOULD PROBABLY TURN TO A EUROPEAN SOURCE. THE PRECISION MEASUREMENTS EQUIPMENT LABORATORY (PMEL) AND FIELD ENGINEERING EQUIPMENT WOULD ALSO VERY LIKELY BE PURCHASED FROM WESTERN

EUROPE. IN THE CASE OF THE FORMER, HOWEVER, A DISTINCT PREFERENCE FOR US TECHNOLOGY EXISTS, AS THE PMEL WOULD SERVICE US-MADE EQUIPMENT.

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PARA 4H: THE ARMS CONTROL IMPACT OF EACH MAJOR ANTICIPATED SALE (PARA 4D, ABOVE) IS MINIMAL. WHILE ALL FOUR PROJECTS DO CONTRIBUTE TO A QUALITATIVE UPGRADING OF EXISTING COMBAT CAPABILITY, NONE DIRECTLY INCREASES QUANTITATIVE ASPECTS. IN EACH CASE, BUT IN VARYING DEGREES, THE PROJECTS IMPROVE TECHNOLOGICAL INFRASTRUCTURE. THE SPIN-OFF POTENTIAL FOR CONTRIBUTING TO NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN NON-MILITARY SECTIONS IS THEREFORE VERY ATTRACTIVE. THE ONGOING MILITARY MODERNIZATION PROGRAM SUPPORTED BY THESE SALES IS ALSO A QUALITATIVE, NOT QUANTITATIVE IMPROVEMENT, AS US EQUIPMENT IS BEING FURNISHED ON A REPLACEMENT BASIS. GOM IS TRYING TO LESSEN THE ARMS INBALANCE WHICH CURRENTLY FAVORS ALGERIA, BUT HAS NO HOPE OR INTENTION OF ACHIEVING PARITY WITH ALGERIA. MOROCCO IS ALSO SUPPORTING ITS WEAK PARTNER IN THE EX-SPANISH SAHARA, MAURITANIA. WITHOUT THIS SUPPORT, MAURITANIA WOULD PROBABLY BE UNABLE TO RESIST EFFECTIVELY THE ALGERIAN-SUPPORTED ACTIVITIES OF THE POLISARIO GUERRILLAS IN ITS PORTION OF THE FORMER SPANISH SAHARA. A COMPARISON OF THE RELATIVE MILITARY STRENGTHS OF MOROCCO AND ALGERIA IS SHOWN BY THIS TABLE:

OTHER

	MANPOWER	ARMORED	NAVAL	COMBAMR				
	ARMY /AIR FC/NAVY	TANKS	VEHICLES	VESSELS	AIRCRAFT			
ALGERIA	80,000	5,000	3,800	450	85	33	175	
MOROCCO	81,000	7,000	4,000	213	199	22	45	

PARA 4I: MOROCCO'S EIGHT-MONTH ELECTORAL PROCESS CULMINATED IN JUNE WITH ELECTION OF ITS NEW PARLIAMENT, A SIGN THAT KING HASSAN II RECOGNIZES THE NEED FOR VISIBLE PROGRESS TOWARD BROADER PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT. THE FULL SPECTRUM OF POLITICAL PARTIES, FROM THE KING'S SUPPORTERS TO THE LEGAL COMMUNIST PARTY, PARTICIPATED ACTIVELY IN THE ELECTIONS, WITH PARTY NEWSPAPERS REFLECTING WIDELY VARYING VIEWS. DESPITE CHARGES OF GOVERNMENT "IRREGULARITIES" IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS, THE OPPOSITION IS PLANNING TO PARTICIPATE IN PARLIAMENTARY LIFE AND EXPECTS TO HAVE POSTS IN A NEW GOVERNMENT. THE ELECTIONS, WHILE IMPERFECT, WERE A SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT OVER THE PAST, ALTHOUGH IT IS STILL TOO EARLY TO ASSESS HOW THIS POLITICAL EVOLUTION WILL BE TRANS-

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LATED INTO POLITICAL REALITY ONCE THE PARLIAMENT ASSUMES IN OCTOBER OF THIS YEAR ITS ADVISORY AND LEGISLATIVE ROLE UNDER

1972 CONSTITUTION. IN A RELATED AREA, DOMESTIC PRESS CENSORSHIP WAS LIFTED IN MARCH AS A CONDITION FOR PARTICIPATION OF THE OPPOSITION IN THE ELECTIONS. ALSO, A SERIES OF TRIALS OF POLITICAL PRISONERS WAS HELD IN 1976 AND EARLY 1977. SOME OF THE ACCUSED HAD BEEN IN PRISON, UNCHARGED AND UNTRIED, FOR SEVERAL YEARS OR MORE. THE GREAT MAJORITY WERE RELEASED, CREDITED WITH TIME ALREADY SERVED, BUT SOME EXTREME LEFTISTS RECEIVED STIFF SENTENCES UP TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT. ONLY SMALL NUMBER OF UNTRIED POLITICAL PRISONERS REMAIN UNDER DETENTION.

THE GOM HAS INITIALLED BUT NOT YET FORMALLY RATIFIED THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR RELATIONS. ADHESION SHOULD IN TIME MAKE MOROCCAN OFFICIALS, PARTICULARLY IN OUTLYING AREAS, MORE ACCUSTOMED TO PROVIDING PROMPT NOTIFICATION TO FOREIGN MISSIONS OF ARRESTS OF THEIR NATIONALS. SUCH ADHESION SHOULD ALSO DIMINISH OCCASIONAL CASES OF MISTREATMENT.

MOROCCO HAS AN EXCELLENT RECORD WITH RESPECT TO ITS JEWISH POPULATION - ONCE THE LARGEST IN THE MIDDLE EAST. DESPITE ARAB-ISRAELI TENSIONS, JEWS IN MOROCCO - NOW NUMBERING 18,000 - REMAIN SECURE. THE KING HAS INVITED THE RETURN OF EMIGRE JEWS FROM ISRAEL AND ELSEWHERE. IN ADDITION, THE KING AND OTHER MOROCCAN OFFICIALS HAVE MET RECENTLY WITH A NUMBER OF EMIGRE JEWISH LEADERS, INCLUDING ISRAELIS.

THE PUNITIVE USE OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO PROMOTE HUMAN RIGHTS IN MOROCCO DOES NOT APPEAR DESIRABLE OR NECESSARY. OUR PROGRAM CAN, ON THE OTHER HAND, CONTRIBUTE POSITIVELY TO INTERNAL STABILITY, THEREBY REINFORCING RECENT POSITIVE TRENDS AND ENHANCING GOM RECEPTIVITY TO OUR ADVICE AND EXAMPLE. THERE IS NO SYSTEMATIC VIOLATION OF THE PHYSICAL OR CULTURAL
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DIGNITY AND THE SAFETY OF THE INDIVIDUAL, SUCH AS TORTURE OR RELIGIOUS REPRESSION. MOROCCO IS MAKING EFFORTS TO IMPROVE DUE PROCESS, AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT IS BEING BROADENED WITH THE RETURN TO PARLIAMENTARY LIFE. ON THE OTHER HAND, SECURITY OF THE KING WILL REMAIN AN UNCOMPROMISING CONCERN OF THE MOROCCAN SECURITY APPARATUS AND ANY "SUBVERSIVES" ARE LIKELY TO BE DEALT WITH SEVERELY. MOROCCAN AUTHORITIES ARE SENSITIVE TO AMERICAN AND WORLD OPINION AND US EMPHASIS ON HUMAN RIGHTS. WHILE GREAT CULTURAL DIFFERENCES PERSIST BETWEEN MOROCCO AND THE ADVANCED WESTERN DEMOCRACIES, MOROCCO

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POSSESSES MANY OF THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL NORMS OF A DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM AND ONE OF THE FEW MULTI-PARTY POLITICAL SYSTEMS IN THE THIRD WORLD, AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS OUTLOOK IS POSITIVE.

PARA 4J: GOM CONCURS WITH THE ULTIMATE GOALS OF RESTRAINT IN CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFER, BUT VIEWS UNILATERAL RESTRAINT AS UNWISE. GOM SEES ITSELF AS A FORCE FOR MODERATION IN THE AREA AND ACTING IN THE INTERESTS OF THE WEST. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT MOROCCO IS A SIGNIFICANT SUPPLIER OF ARMS TO ANY OTHER COUNTRY. PROSPECTS OF SUPPORT FOR US POLICY OF RESTRAINT IN ARMS TRANSFERS MUST BE VIEWED IN LIGHT OF THE ABOVE, AS GOM IS NOT LIKELY TO IMPERIL ITS NATIONAL DEFENSE.

PARA 4K: THE GOM IS KEENLY AWARE OF THE DESIRABILITY OF PROFESSIONAL MILITARY TRAINING IN THE U.S. ALTHOUGH GOM HAS NOT ACCEPTED THIS TYPE OF TRAINING FOR THE PAST THREE YEARS, THEIR DECISION WAS LOGICAL. WHEN THE MILITARY MODERNIZATION PROGRAM WAS INITIATED, GOM PLACED PRIORITY ON THE LIMITED FUNDS AVAILABLE TO ACQUIRE A CADRE OF SKILLS NECESSARY TO OPERATE AND MAINTAIN THE EQUIPMENT CONTRACTED FROM U.S. RESOURCES. LATER THE SAHARA ISSUE BECAME A NATIONAL PRIORITY. THESE TWO INDEPENDENT ACTIVITIES IN CONCERT OVERTAXED FAR'S TRAINED MANPOWER. THEREFORE PROFESSIONAL
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TRAINING WAS DELAYED, ESPECIALLY WHERE LANGUAGE TRAINING WAS A PREREQUISITE. FAR IS NOW IN A POSITION TO RESUME PROFESSIONAL MILITARY TRAINING IN THE U.S. WE HAVE RECEIVED PROFESSIONAL TRAINING REQUESTS FOR NINE (9) OFFICERS DURING FY-78 AND EXPECT A CONSIDERABLE INCREASE ABOVE THE FY 78 FIGURE FOR FY 79. TYPES OF PROFESSIONALLY ORIENTED TRAINING THAT SHOULD BE PROGRAMMED

FOR FY 79 ARE:

- (1) ARMY
 - (A) WAR COLLEGE, C&GSC
 - (B) OFF ADV CRS FOR INF, ARMOR, ARTY, ORD, OM, SIG, ENG AND TRANS (MOTOR TRANSPORT)
 - (C) OFF BASIC CRS FOR ORD AND QM (PHASE I & LL, TRACK 1 8-10-C20)
 - (D) BASIC ABR CRS
 - (E) RANGER CRS
- (2) NAVAL SUPPLY CORPS SCHOOL
- (3) USMC: USMC AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE SCHOOL
- (4) AIR FORCE:
 - (A) USAF AIR UNIVERSITY: SOS, ACSC, AWC
 - (B) USAF LOGISTIC SYSTEM MANAGEMENT CRS
- (5) DOD: INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE MANAGEMENT COURSE

GOM WANTS TO DO AS MUCH OF THE REQUIRED EQUIPMENT-RELATED TRAINING AS POSSIBLE IN-COUNTRY. HOWEVER, MOROCCANS REALIZE THAT SOME HIGHLY SPECIALIZED TRAINING IS BEST PROVIDED IN CONUS. WHEN SUCH TRAINING IS PURCHASED WITH THE BASIC LETTER OF OFFER OR COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS FOR EQUIPMENT, IT IS BUDGETED WITH ACQUISITION FUNDS. UNFORTUNATELY, UNDER THE ARMY MODERNIZATION PROGRAM, TRAINING WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE LETTERS OF OFFER FOR BASIC EQUIPMENT. HISTORICALLY GOM OPERATING BUDGETS HAVE BEEN RELATIVELY LOW, WHICH MEANS THAT SOME TRAINING NOT PROVIDED BY EXTERNAL SOURCES IS ABANDONED OR CARRIED OUT IN MOROCCO IN SUBSTANDARD CONDITIONS. GOM WOULD, IF REQUIRED, PAY FOR EQUIPMENT-RELATED TRAINING UNDER THE FMS PROGRAM BUT WOULD LEAN TOWARD TRAINING IN MOROCCO BY LARGER AND MORE DIVERSIFIED MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS THAN HAVE BEEN USED IN THE PAST. IF REQUIRED TO PAY, GOM WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE THE NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS TRAINED IN THE CONUS IN ESSENTIAL SKILLS BELOW REQUIRED LEVELS.

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MENT-RELATED TRAINING UNDER THE FMS PROGRAM BUT WOULD LEAN TOWARD TRAINING IN MOROCCO BY LARGER AND MORE DIVERSIFIED MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS THAN HAVE BEEN USED IN THE PAST. IF REQUIRED TO PAY, GOM WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE THE NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS TRAINED IN THE CONUS IN ESSENTIAL SKILLS BELOW REQUIRED LEVELS.

IT IS IN THE INTEREST OF USG TO FUND TRAINING FOR THE COMPLEX EQUIPMENT PREVIOUSLY PURCHASED FROM US RESOURCES TO AVOID FUTURE BAD RELATIONS SHOULD MOROCCO BE UNABLE TO MAINTAIN OR OPERATE SUCH EQUIPMENT PROPERLY. IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXISTING GOM FINANCIAL REGULATIONS IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR GOM TO FUND TRAVEL AND LIVING EXPENSES AT THE REQUIRED DOLLAR AMOUNTS TO ADEQUATELY SUSTAIN A MOROCCAN TRAINEE ATTENDING A CONUS-BASED SCHOOL. IN THE PAST, WHEN TRAINING WAS OFFERED LESS TRAVEL AND LIVING EXPENSE, GOM HAS ELECTED TO ACCEPT A DEGRADATION OF MISSION CAPABILITY IN LIEU OF ACCEPTING THE TRAINING UNDER THOSE STIPULATIONS.

AMBASSADOR'S SUMMARY

AS I HOPE WILL BE CLEAR FROM THE ABOVE, OUR MILITARY ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP WITH MOROCCO HAS A CLEAR, LIMITED, AND COHERENT PURPOSE DIRECTLY RELATED TO OUR FOREIGN POLICY AIMS.

WE SEEK REGIONAL STABILITY IN NORTH AFRICA, WHILE AVOIDING CONFRONTATION WITH THE USSR WHICH MIGHT RESULT FROM THE TENSIONS BETWEEN MOROCCO AND ALGERIA-LIBYA. WE HAVE AN INCREASING STAKE IN MOROCCAN COOPERATION WITH US IN A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC AREAS CITED AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS TELEGRAM. FINALLY, OUR ARMS SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP CONTINUES TO BE OUR KEY TOOL IN SLOWLY DEVELOPING OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE MILITARY, WHICH IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT THAT THE KING WERE REMOVED FROM POWER BY ACCIDENT OR COUP, WOULD PROVIDE THE ONLY REAL ALTERNATIVE POWER TO ENSURE GOVERNMENTAL CONTINUITY.

THIS ALMSOT TEXT-BOOK EXAMPLE OF HOW A MILITARY ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP CAN AND SHOULD SERVE OUR LARGER FOREIGN POLICY IS BASED ON SEVERAL KEY CONSIDERATIONS: WE ARE NOT OUT IN FRONT -- INDEED THE FRENCH REMAIN THE LEADING RAMS SUPPLIER TO MOROCCO; WE HELP MOROCCO PROVIDE A MINIMUM DETERRENCE TO A REAL AND

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DEMONSTRABLE THREAT WHICH BOTH WE AND THEY PERCEIVE IN SIMILAR TERMS; AND THE MOROCCANS HAVE SHOWN A REMARKABLE WILLINGNESS TO ABIDE BY THE RULES OF THE GAME IN USING THE MATERIAL WE FURNISH IN THE WAY OUR LEGISLATION AND POLICIES DICTATE.

I HAVE SINCE MY ARRIVAL TAKEN A KEEN PERSONAL INTEREST IN ENSURING THAT OUR MILITARY RELATIONSHIP BE CONDUCTED IN A RATIONAL, CONTROLLED MANNER. THE COUNTRY TEAM WILL CONTINUE TO PURSUE THIS OBJECTIVE.

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